Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction First Edition

This was an insightful, well organized, and easy to understand analysis of the main philosophical or theoretical foundations of von Clausewitz’ On War.

Karl Von Clausewitz's "On War" has survived his own lifetime by nearly two centuries, and counting. It has remained relevant because of its capture of many essentials of the study of war. "On War" is a complex and challenging read. All the more reason to let experienced historian Michael Howard provide an introduction.In under 90 pages, Michael Howard offers a brief account of the life of Karl Von Clausewitz and its influences on his great work on the nature of war. Howard provides a synthesis of the main points and suitable cautions on the incomplete nature of "On War". Howard's final chapter demonstrates that "On War" remains relevant, a point well known to recent generations of servings officers in many armies. Well recommended as a starting point to "On War."

But perhaps keeping it short allows a beginner in theory of war a chance to at least know its main principles without becoming overwhelmed by the density of the original text. Not useful for deep and detailed research.

Given that the goal of this book is to impart upon the reading a sense of understanding and knowledge about basic ideas of military theorist von Clausewitz, I can only say that this book hit its mark in brilliant fashion.Short, concise, yet filled to the brim with information. I particularly enjoyed how author Mr. Howard set a chapter on "Clausewitz in his time" wherein we see the thinking of the day, the atmosphere in which Clausewitz 'thought,' and so forth. This really set the basis for which one can understand Clausewitz further. I also liked the chapter on the legacy of Clausewitz in which Mr. Howard presents various criticisms of Clausewitz's ideas, and then proceeds to counter them.Overall a must read for all those who are interested in understanding military endeavors- historical or current- which, if you are reading this, then it's safe to say you are in fact interested. Enjoy!

Howard is a master of he topic and this short summary provides a succinct overview of Clausewitz’s thinking and how it was influenced by his experience and the thinking of his time. Importantly it explains how his thinking developed over time and so places many of his better known principles in the context that Clausewitz intended.Well worth a read.

Anyone thinking of reading this book should be advised that it contains 292 mistakes, which is three times as many mistakes as the book has pages. The three most prolific categories of mistakes are misquotations (125); missing, partial or incomplete references (64); and wrong, missing, inaccurate, or incomplete page references (45).Here are three of the more notable mistakes:1. "The most splendid of victories was thus nothing in itself unless it was also the means to the attainment of a political end; whether that end was the total destruction of the enemy state or the laying down of whatever peace terms policy might require." (38)Misrepresentation: Given that the previous sentence and the following paragraph in the text quote "On War" and that the stated purpose of "Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction" is to explain the continuing relevance of "On War" (4), one would naturally assume that the clause after the semicolon is paraphrasing "On War." But that assumption would be wrong. In fact, it is not "On War" that is being paraphrased, but rather Clausewitz’s “first recorded reflections on strategy” (from 1804).(a) Moreover, while the version quoted above and the one in "On War" resemble each another—as would be expected of an early and a final draft—they also differ significantly: “. . . either the objective is to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.”2. "[Clausewitz] would have noted with interest the problems that confronted the Allies in determining the enemy ‘centre of gravity’, and the decision by the American High Command in 1941 that it lay, not with their immediate enemy, Japan, but with that enemy’s stronger ally, Germany." (72)Historical error: The Germany First decision was one of priorities: Against which foe should the Allies concentrate their efforts? Since Germany was considered the greater threat, its defeat became the Allies’ first order of business.(b) Further, there is no evidence the “American High Command” considered Germany “the enemy ‘centre of gravity.’” Indeed, the concept was irrelevant to belligerents (i.e., Germany, Italy, and Japan) that rarely consulted with one another let alone developed a joint strategy together.3. "[The soldier] could not expect the theorist to provide all the answers to his problems, ‘stamping out war plans as from a kind of truth-machine’ (p. 168)." (32)Misquotation: Except for the last five words, what is paraphrased and quoted above as being from "On War" is dissimilar to what "On War" actually states on p. 168:"The complex forms of cognition should be used as little as possible, and one should never use elaborate scientific guidelines as if they were a kind of truth machine."a. Howard, 17, 36, 49. However, nowhere in "Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction" is a specific source for this early draft clearly identified.b. Carl von Clausewitz, "On War," trans. ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69.c. Louis Morton, "United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years," ed. Stetson Conn (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), 72, 85-86, 90-91, 308; Max Hastings, "Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945" (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 195-196; Gerhard L. Weinberg, "A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 242.

Clearly and concisely written with important things contextualisation, both historical, cultural and intellectual. Rich with quotations presenting key ideas and concepts.

Good choice for military theorists and enthusiast. Beware that the content was written some time ago and writing style may be difficult for some to consume and deconstruct. Suitable for the progressing novice into deeper military strategic material, specific to military warfare and less abstract than malleable and adaptive doctrines like Sun Tzu's Art of War.

Michael Howard é sempre uma referência fundamental a ler atentamente. Neste caso, de forma concisa e numa linguagem clara, acessível, dá-nos uma ideia do que vamos encontrar na obra de Clausewitz. Aconselho a ler este pequeno livro de Michael Howard antes de iniciarem a leitura de "Da Guerra" de Clausewitz.

Ohne jede gedankliche Kraft, dazu ziemlich langweilig geschrieben. Kann man sich also sparen. Besser direkt zum Original gehen und Clausewitz selbst lesen.

Sir Michael Howard is perhaps Britain's greatest living military historian. He combines an ability to get to the very core of the subject he is writing about with clear, lucid language. Karl Von Clausewitz is THE military thinker. He got the very core of his subject, war. Howard outlines clearly the central pillars of Clausewitz' ideas about war so I won't repeat them here, but suffice to say his observations apply as equally to the limited, dynastic wars of Eighteenth century Europe as they would do to a future nuclear war. This book is superb. Anyone wanting to understand the nature and purposes of that most complex and terrible of human interactions, war, can do no better than start here.

本書は、『戦争論』の著者として有名なクラウゼヴィッツの思想を、軍事史研究の大家であり同書の英訳者でもある著者が要約し、概説したものである。　本書は、まずクラウゼヴィッツの思想の史的背景を取り上げる。そこでは、当時の軍事思想の基本的な考え方やそこで中心とされたテーマ、政治史上の事件といった諸要素が、クラウゼヴィッツの思想とどのような関係にあるか、という点が明らかにされる。　続いて、本書はクラウゼヴィッツの思想の要点を、（１）戦争の理論と実践、（２）戦争における目的と手段、（３）絶対戦争と限定戦争、の３点に絞って解説する。著者は、歴史・理論の学習と士気・将兵の質との関係、政治と軍事の関係、戦争の類型とその差をもたらす要因、といった点に焦点を当てながら、摩擦、天才、重心、偶然といった中核的概念に言及していく。　最後に、本書はクラウゼヴィッツが後世に与えた影響を概説する。彼の思想は、特に決戦概念について、第１次世界大戦までの西欧における地上戦との関係を取り沙汰されることが多いが、著者はそれに限らず、海軍、空軍や核戦力とクラウゼヴィッツの思想との関係にも触れている。　以上の内容を盛り込んだ本文の量は、和書の新書サイズで僅か77頁。クラウゼヴィッツの思想を専門的に学習しようと志す初学者にとってはこの上もない入門書である。また、国際関係論や歴史学といった他領域を専門とする人が彼の思想を全体的に学ぶ必要がある場合には、本書「だけ」を用いればよいとすら思える。広範な思想のエッセンスを厚さ6ミリに凝縮した本書にはあたかもダイヤモンドの趣があり、初学者が手中にできる価値としてはいかなる和書にも代えがたい。『戦争論』の和訳を初見で１回通読する時間があれば、それを本書に振り向け、ダイヤをしゃぶり尽くすようにこの小品を読み込むべきである。

What can i say It's Clausewitz The man who coined the fraise 'War is the continuation of policy (politics) by other means' I bet he wished he'd got royalties on that now!